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Abstract  
During periods of flux generated by Tunisia's transition to democracy, all 
classes of women found the ‘political opportunities’ to push for change 
even if they did not necessarily share the same ambition or dream. The 
mobilisation, contestations, confrontations and struggle of Tunisian 
women in the post-revolution period alert us to the need to examine the 
factors behind this activism and the extent of its visibility. It is important to 
revisit the Tunisian women's movement in order to understand its 
interaction with other forms of power such as politics, religion, and class; 
as well as the extent to which such activism is a renegotiation of women’s 
identities and status in post-revolution Tunisia. Indeed, the extent to which 
the rise of Islamism and its conservative gender ideology can affect 
feminist movement activities has been one of the main issues of debate. 
The divide between Tunisian women - secularist and feminist versus 
Islamist women (Nahdhawiyat) begs to be explored. This divide can be 
understood as the expected materialisation of binaries that manifestly 
reveal the hard task of pursuing accountability of feminist movements 
regarding broader and universal feminist issues of epistemology, agenda, 
and ethics within the new local context.  
 
This article is an attempt to address the binary framings of 
secular/liberal/elitist/Westernised feminist movements against the re-
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emerging religious/indigenous/ethical and conservative discourse. It aims 
to shed light on the influence of such opposed frames and their impact on 
women’s struggles for empowerment, and the accountability of both state 
and non-state actors. 
 
Keywords: feminism, Islamism, liberalism, elitism, conservatism, Tunisian 
women activism 
 
 
Introduction 
During periods of flux generated by Tunisia's transition to democracy, all 
classes of women found the ‘political opportunities’ to push for change 
even if they did not necessarily share the same ambition or dream. The 
mobilisation, contestations, confrontations and struggles of Tunisian 
women during the post-revolution period alert us to the need to examine 
the factors behind their activism and the extent of its visibility. It is 
important to revisit the Tunisian women's movement in order to 
understand its interaction with other forms of power such as politics, 
religion, and class; as well as the extent to which such activism is a 
renegotiation of women’s identities and status in post-revolution Tunisia. 
Indeed, the extent to which the rise of Islamism and its conservative 
gender ideology can affect feminist movement activities has been one of 
the main issues of debate. The divide between Tunisian women - secularist 
and feminist versus Islamist women (Nahdhawiyat) begs to be explored. 
This divide can be understood as the expected materialisation of binaries 
that manifestly reveal the hard task of pursuing accountability of feminist 
movements regarding broader and universal feminist issues of 
epistemology, agenda, and ethics within the new local context. 
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This article is an attempt to address the binary framings of 
secular/liberal/elitist/Westernised feminist movements against the re-
emerging religious/indigenous/ethical and conservative discourse. It aims 
to shed light on the influence of such opposing frames and their impact on 
women’s struggles for empowerment, and the accountability of both state 
and non-state actors. 
 
A Historical Background to Emerging Binary Frames 
The first Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba led the country after its 
independence from France in 1956 until his removal from office in 1987 by 
Zine El Abedine Ben Ali1. Bourguiba chose to establish a modern 
educational and welfare system and promote women's rights rather than 
build a strong military and involve it in politics. Since 1956, the Personal 
Status Code2 banned polygamy, granted equality in divorce proceedings 
and established a minimum age for and mutual consent in marriage. It 
granted women’s rights to work, move, open bank accounts, and start 
businesses. Bourguiba insisted on the maintenance of women's rights 
through social institutions (see Charrad, 1997; 2007). Still, Bourguiba’s 
regime continued to rely on basic Islamic tenets. While promulgating the 
CPS, his administration maintained the new was not a break with Islamic 
heritage, but ‘a new phase in Islamic innovation, similar to earlier phases 
in the history of Islamic thought’ (Charrad 2007, pp. 15-19). 
 
It was the second president, Ben Ali, who promoted women's rights and 
continued to implement reforms favourable towards women. In 2007, the 
minimum age of marriage was raised from 15 to 18 for both men and 
women. In the 2000s Tunisia expanded women’s rights with regard to 
marriage contracts, alimony, and custodial rights over children. These top 
down policies for women’s rights were intended to portray Tunisia 
internationally as embracing modernity. 
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The polarisation between the secularists/liberalists/leftists and the 
Islamists became visible during the 1980s, and characterised the broader 
debate on political, economic, legal and social choices and policies. The 
debate included women’s rights and other issues, framed within opposing 
visions that pitted the Western model of liberation against a conservative 
one rooted in the Islamic perspective. This divide involved supporters of 
‘modernity and contemporality’ (al-hadathawa-l-mu‘asara) on the one 
hand, and supporters of ‘tradition and authenticity’ (al-turathwal-asala) 
on the other. The debate over the role of language in society continues to 
elucidate this divide, even today. While leftists, modernists, and secularists 
believe French is more appropriate for the new context of nation state 
modernisation, Islamists and nationalists link Arabic language to religion, 
the ‘sacred book’, and collective identity. Hence, modernity and tradition 
compete for ideological influence and, at times, hegemonic political 
expression.3 
 
Although the first generation of educated women were part of Muslim 
organisations during French ‘rule’, many of the post-independence figures 
were Western-educated and became involved in political life and social 
activism. Political leadership, and its only dominant party, championed 
women’s involvement in the public and political spheres. State-sponsored 
women’s organising contributed to this activity in the fields of education, 
health and other key sectors. A large number of women leaders travelled 
to Europe for education and training before returning to Tunisia and 
participating in this state agenda. However, in 1975 a ‘reactionary’ 
discourse emerged when President Bourguiba and his guests gathered 
during Ramadan for a scholarly lecture given by a female scholar. Instead 
of praising Bourguiba and the progressive Personal Status Code, renowned 
philosophy professor Hind Shalabi criticised key provisions of the Code and 
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called for a return ‘to the fundamental foundations of [Islam]’ (Toraifi, 
2012). From the mid-seventies to the early eighties a divide between the 
state’s project and the emerging Islamist movement became apparent. It 
initially involved universities whose students fascinated by communism 
and nationalism and those who were divided between those who 
supported the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Muslim Brotherhood activism 
in the region. 
 
The divide impacted perceptions of accountability related to political order 
and social justice. The state accused Islamists of seeking to return to the 
dark ages, while Islamists attacked the government for uprooting Muslim 
women from their Islamic identity. The period was marked by repression 
and trials of several Islamist activists, and a widening social divide between 
supporters of a modernist view and those calling for the return to the rule 
of Islam. There was no emergence of an autonomous feminist movement, 
women's activism remained circumscribed within a national political 
conflict between the state and the dissident Islamist voices. Leftists were 
part of this debate; although they were also feared by the ruling party, 
they had no specific women's or feminist agenda. 
 
(Demonstration organised by the Tunisian Association of Women Democrats (ATFD) for 
a secular Tunisia. Author Amel Grami (wearing blue). Photo: Lina ben Mheni). 
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In the 1990s, a new class of female scholars emerged the majority of whom 
were bilingual or trilingual and either were the product of the new 
educational system or educated in Europe. Many worked in the State’s 
education and judicial institutions before engaging in political life. 
Although some were initially used by the dominant state-led feminism to 
fight radical Islamic movements, many became active on more than one 
level. They became increasingly visible in the public sphere through the 
media and political participation through the ruling party. However, some 
pointed out the low level of women’s representation in the government, 
the parliament and civil society organisations and unions. Radhia Hadded, 
President of UNFT (National Union of Tunisian Women-the major State-
sponsored female organisation), criticised the lack of freedom of 
expression and association. Amel ben Aba and Zeineb Cherni were among 
other feminist members of the communist organisation ‘Perspectives’ to 
denounce the state feminism.4 Despite his revolutionary ideas, Bourguiba 
chose to reinforce the more traditional Tunisian women's roles, often 
represented in his speeches as mothers, wives, and guardians of Islamic 
tradition. 
 
Due to Tunisian system of education and educational policy in general, the 
field of religious studies mainly remained male-dominated. Feminists used 
the West as their frame of reference and held that it would be counter-
productive to employ a local religious framework. Most of these women 
were more aligned with the left and not knowledgeable about religious 
issues,5 having a feminist liberal socialist view. However today, educated 
women are increasingly embracing an Islamic vision as a pathway to 
liberation and empowerment. Accordingly, their vision of Islam is often 
described as a way of life, a cultural force and consists in wearing the veil, 
trying to exemplify Islamic values, helping the marginalised and vulnerable 
people and promoting 'moderate Islam'. Along with this trend,  a number 
of feminists have emerged who, because of their knowledge of Islam's 
Feminist Dissent 
 
 
29 Grami. Feminist Dissent 2018 (3), pp. 23-56 
 
founding texts and heritage have chosen to work within the field of religion 
and cultural identity while simultaneously defending their feminist and 
women's rights agendas. 
 
Thanks to an increasing reception of new approaches to humanities, and 
a rich and complex debate on religion, women and culture since the late 
1990s, a new group of feminist scholars have focused on a reinterpretation 
of religious texts. This opening has created new venues for Tunisian 
feminist scholars who initially did not see themselves as ‘Islamic 
feminists’.6 The deconstruction of religious discourses has been one of 
several strategies for addressing patriarchy and state feminism as well as 
contesting men's monopoly of religious discourse and knowledge.  
 
The fact that the Islamic movement politicised religion and appropriated 
its norms and values influenced feminist scholars of the 1980s to act and 
react. They endeavoured to counter this discourse and defend themselves 
against charges of being Western pawns, implementing an imperialist 
agenda, lacking religious knowledge and legitimacy/authenticity. Some 
feminists, including myself, started to deconstruct religious discourses, 
explaining that women’s status in Tunisia is related to not only the history 
of the reformist movement but also the history of Islamic thought in the 
country, which includes the Tunisian ‘brand’ of Maliki fiqh.  
 
Being a Member of ‘The Tunisian School of Islamic Thought’ 
As a university student, I was particularly influenced by the work of Nawal 
el-Saadawi and Fatima Mernissi. Both women illuminated for me the 
differential treatment of men and women in a patriarchal society, helping 
me to reflect on processes by which women are constructed as 'other'. 
Some of my male professors, too, encouraged students to learn more 
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about feminist theories and approaches, believing feminism was a tool for 
female advancement. At that time, I witnessed the rise of the Islamist 
movement and its confrontation with leftists/secularists at the university. 
Some young scholars chose to align themselves with either the Western 
feminist tradition (often influenced by second wave French feminism) or 
Islamist ideology. I preferred to focus on historical critical approaches to 
tradition influenced by the work of pioneers such as Nasr Hamed Abu 
Zaydand Mohamed Arkoun, among others. 
 
Believing that women can participate in the effort to develop ‘fresh’ 
interpretations of religious texts (both Sunni and Shi'i), I decided to study 
‘feminist interpreters of the scripture’ in different religions. As a member 
of an international interfaith research and dialogue group, ‘GRIC’ (Groupe 
Islamo -Chretien) I value openness towards, and cooperation between and 
among, women activists of various ideological inclinations. Since I was 
aware that the strategy of locating gender equality within religion has its 
limitations and may not result in equality for all women in the world, I 
decided to analyse women’s history and experiences from different 
perspectives and through new lenses. Moreover, as a scholar and activist, 
I needed to reflect on the question of whether or not taking human rights 
conventions as a point of departure would be strategically more effective 
in advancing women’s rights than the reinterpretation of religious texts. I 
finally chose to combine both strategies, combining different perspectives 
and working on the potential intersectionalities rather than established 
theoretical categories.  As a result, today I situate my analysis of the legal 
relationship between the state and women within a framework of 
‘equality’, and citizenship.7 Employing a multidisciplinary approach and 
taking gender as a category of analysis, I question religious texts and 
challenge religious scholars who defend a literal reading of the Quran and 
consider themselves authentic representatives of Islamic heritage. In fact, 
I was among the few women scholars who agreed to debate with men 
Feminist Dissent 
 
 
31 Grami. Feminist Dissent 2018 (3), pp. 23-56 
 
representing official religious institutions in various Arab countries, which 
brought me recognition and a certain authority. 
 
Today I identify myself as a feminist, but I am not among the secular 
feminists who view religion as fundamentally incompatible with feminism. 
Rather, I think that it is time Tunisian feminists take religion into account, 
recognise social change and different women's needs. Neila Sillini, Olfa 
Youssef, Zahia Jouiro, myself and other scholars as women who have 
… reshaped the debate on the role of Islam in society and on 
Qur’anic hermeneutics. They play the role of public intellectuals 
detached from the Islamic feminism movement as conceived in 
other Muslim countries.’ These scholars are known as ‘the new 
reformists’,  and are now part of  The Tunisian School of Islamic 
studies (L'école Tunisienne d'islamologie) founded by Abdel Majid 
Charfi,8 who holds there are different Islams and we should be 
aware of the diversity of Muslims’ environments, ways of life and 
understanding of religious texts at different historical moments. 
The Moroccan, Abdu Fillali Ansary agrees, adding, ‘Terms such as 
‘democracy,’ ‘human rights,’ or ‘civil society’ do not exist in a 
vacuum, but travel, are translated to Arabic and become part of 
the political discourse (Ansary 2012, p. 10). 
 
The establishment of modern university departments, following the 
Western model, has influenced this wave of scholars. They have focused 
on fields as diverse as sociology, political science, philosophy, philology, 
history and anthropology, leading them to use modern critical disciplinary 
tools to analyse their own societies and adopt a historical perspective 
towards contemporary issues. Feminist scholars trained in this vein seek 
the empowerment of women through knowledge and critical engagement 
rather than a repudiation of their cultures. Using modern disciplinary 
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methodologies, they deconstruct the classical discourse on interpretation 
elaborated mainly by men. This new Islamic reading of religious texts 
emphasises the role of context and history in interpretation, without 
questioning the texts’ ontologically divine nature. These scholars also 
rigorously examine the Hadith tradition (sayings of the prophet 
Muhammed) and are unanimous in their demand for gender justice as 
integral to a just society. 
 
Women's Activism and Binaries in the Aftermath of the Tunisian 
Revolution 
Tunisian women have been transformed into symbols of the tensions 
between tradition and modernity, East and West, feminism and Islamism. 
The ‘woman question’ has become a symbolic terrain for political and 
ideological struggles in periods of instability – post-independence as well 
as post-revolution. During the years preceding the Tunisian revolution, 
growing anti-Bourguiba sentiment emerged among certain segments of 
the population despite a long standing reverence for the Personal Status 
Code.9 These dissenters felt his numerous achievements came at the 
expense of estrangement from Islamic identity, norms and authentic social 
values; a view shared by some women who defended the return to an 
authentic patriarchal order. In this sense, the divide among women reveals 
an important disparity regarding their status and the impossibility of 
reaching a unified voice or vision for the future of women in Tunisia. 
 
Scholars like Sillini, Youssef and myself became more visible after the 2011 
revolution and we participated in many talk shows, debates, and 
conferences. After being used by the authoritarian regime as a political 
tool, the media industry has transformed following the revolution. 
Tunisians began to discuss openly and freely: the role of religion (Shari’a 
law)10, the Personal Status Code, secularism, and other theoretical 
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subjects considered fundamental in the process of writing the new 
constitution as well as building a new civil and democratic state. Female 
scholars have used all the tools available: mainstream media (press, radio 
and television), social media (Facebook pages, YouTube, blogs) and 
publishing to play an important role in clarifying many religious concepts, 
including some used by Nahdha Party11 deputies in the Constituent 
Assembly.12 By using oral narratives, popular proverbs, life stories, and 
testimonies we have drawn attention to the forgotten or marginalised 
female voices that have shaped the history and culture of our society. In 
short, feminist scholars have helped to refashion the consciousness of the 
new generation from a gender perspective. 
 
Scholars like Youssef, Sillini and myself are also committed to action in the 
public sphere and have targeted policy makers, as well as civil society to 
sensitise them to the high cost of excluding women from social reform and 
democratisation. As scholar-activists we demonstrate our commitment to 
accountability in the sense that, ‘If being accountable involves being 
answerable for one’s actions, the principle of accountability can be 
extended from formal to informal institutions and from collective to 
individual actors’ (Cornwall 2017, p. 11). 
 
Scholars have become increasingly involved in ‘action research’, merging 
intellectual and academic activities with militant action where 
appropriate. Action research is:  
a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing 
practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes… 
It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and 
practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical 
solutions to issues of pressing concern to people, and more 
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generally the flourishing of individual persons and their 
communities (Reason and Bradbury 2001, p. 1). 
 
When women engage in the interpretation of religious text and enter the 
public arena for debate or action, they create a different form of 
knowledge, using different tools for both its production and 
dissemination. The post-revolution Tunisian experience led to public 
acknowledgment of some secular feminist scholars as specialists on 
religious knowledge. Nonetheless, secularists are not yet ready to concede 
to the idea of a fully privatised religion, or the total separation between 
religion and politics.13 
 
In Egypt, religious scholars at Al-Azhar University have been actively 
involved in the political restructuring currently ongoing in their country, 
calling incessantly for the reform of religious discourse. In Tunisia, 
however, scholars at the theological school Zeitouna University14 have 
remained outside the transformation process, despite a long reformist 
tradition, since most are supporters of the collapsed regime. After the 
revolution, some joined the Nahdha Party and a few became close to 
Salafist groups. The majority of women scholars from Zeitouna have 
shown no interest in playing a role during the transitional period. Many 
either express conservative views or reject the secular perspective in the 
belief that the gender perspective is a threat to Islam, and a Western 
heretical approach. Fatma Shakout, for instance, who has campaigned for 
a radical and conservative interpretation of Islam, dismissed the Personal 
Status Code as dissident from Shari’a. On many occasions, conservative 
voices have risen against progressive projects involving women such as the 
Parity Law, the suspension of reservation on the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and 
other reforms. By looking at the Islamic past for a model, Zeitouna scholars 
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have sought to reproduce sexual difference as both a cultural and 
theological necessity. 
 
After the revolution, the Personal Status Code was at the heart of the 
ideological conflict between feminists, secularists and extremist views 
(some members of En Nahdha and Salafists). Bourguibawas dismissed by 
Nahdha, CPR (Congress for the Republic, a centre-left secular political 
party) and the Salafists for imposing on Tunisian women a Western 
perspective that undermined their role in the construction of an authentic 
Islamic order. Secularists defended Bourguiba as ‘the liberator of women’, 
insisting on the need to advance women’s rights. The conflict highlighted 
a serious cleavage among scholars leading to a visible divide between 
those seeking an authentic lost Islamic order and those seeking to advance 
women’s universal human rights. The latter were criticised for being 
defenders of immoral and dissident practices, and in favour of LGBTQ 
rights. 
 
The Impact of the Divide on the Political Process 
After the revolution, some women activists decided to run for election in 
2011. While women from Nahdhawere supported by their party, leading 
female figures from the democratic block15 and human rights activists 
(Saida Garrash and Boshra Bel Haj-Hamida among others) dealt with 
Islamists' manipulation of their image, stories and agendas. Although they 
had opposed the Ben Ali regime, these activists were dubbed traitors 
because they had built coalitions with other feminist groups around the 
world. They faced harassment and intimidation from Islamists and were 
subjected to police surveillance. Social networks dismissed them as liberal 
women of bad reputation and a disgrace to the ideal of a pure Islamic 
order. 
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In their electoral campaign, Islamist groups represented feminist activism 
as a threat to men's natural privileges and status in society, often 
portraying women activists as deviant and morally transgressive of a divine 
and ideal social order. Being secular, activists were portrayed as ‘non-
believers’, Westernised women trying to impose Western values on 
Tunisian women, and thus to undermine their religious and cultural 
traditions. Attacks on rights activists were designed to undermine their 
legitimacy, an echo of previous regimes. Caricatures and cruel videos16 
were widely shared by Nahdha supporters, portraying women activists as 
enemies of the ummah (Muslim society). As Manel Zouabi writes,  
Soumaya [Ghannoushi, Nahdha leader] polarizes feminist 
activists from the start. She constructs them as the evil side and 
herself as the righteous one. … Soumaya restricts secular feminist 
women’s agency to inappropriate dress code, dictatorial elitism, 
and un-Islamic consumption of cigarettes and alcohol. These 
feminists, therefore, are transformed into a social repulsive 
threat (Zouabi, 2016).17 
While feminists received regime support from the ruling government 
before the revolution, following the revolution Islamists saw them as 
supporters of the state. They treated them as if they are against Islam as a 
whole. Their objection to wearing the veil in public was considered not 
only as hostility against Islamic principles but also against democratic 
ones.18 Yet for many activists, the fight against fundamentalism was and 
continues to be a profoundly democratic struggle and inevitably associates 
them with a regime that has held a similar discourse on women’s rights. 
 
As a result of the Islamist campaign, women’s rights in general have 
become closely associated with Bourguiba and Ben Ali, both of whom are 
seen as dictators and enemies of religion. Islamists often fail to grasp what 
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activists understand - not all acts against the state are acts of resistance, 
and not all acts supporting the state signal acquiescence. Because of the 
campaign, most feminist candidates experienced harassment and violence 
in public. Men from various political parties (Islamists as well as leftist and 
secular) used different methods to silence women’s voices, devalue them 
and perpetuate stereotypes, confirming political parties to be ‘private 
clubs for men’ (UNDP 2012, p. 14). 
 
Islamist parties (Nahdha, Ansar Asharia and Hizb Attahrir) have a negative 
perception of women’s rights; they reject family laws as a secular action 
against Shari’a and believe the idea of women’s empowerment has 
already gone too far and has disempowered men. Some political leaders 
from En Nahdha close to the Salafists believe the moral and even economic 
ills of society are the result of estrangement from Islamic cultural heritage 
and laws.  
 
To get voters’ support, Islamists used the narrative of oppressed veiled 
women as victims of the former authoritarian regime. They published 
documentaries and interviews with some mothers and wives of prisoners 
to evoke people's empathy and support for Islamist women as bearers of 
an authentic moral and political order that had been repressed. Although 
the veil was no longer considered a problematic issue in the new political 
context in the sense that women were free to wear it, Islamists provoked 
a debate about its earlier ban under Ben Ali. They accused feminists of 
being accomplices to the repression Islamists had faced. Thus, the veil 
itself has become an iconic sign of difference (both political and 
ideological). This in itself was a strategic move altering the visual, and 
therefore the ideological landscape. The first legislative elections after the 
revolution gave Nahdha Party a majority of 89 seats. There were 49 
women elected to the Constituent Assembly out of 217 representatives 
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(equating to 26.3 per cent). Nahdhawi women MPs were a majority among 
women in the parliament, clearly identifiable by their dress code, unified 
discourse and attitudes.  
 
Rather than normalising religion as one identity point among many, or as 
a complex category that often defies easy characterisation, the 
identification of religion has become a festish and the starting  point from 
which social relations are enacted and from which institutional policy is 
developed (Beaman 2013, p. 147). Nahdhawi women defended their party 
as a civil, ‘moderate political party’; however, they made use of their 
emotional experiences as veiled women. This positioning was constituted 
by dissociating themselves from 'feminists', their discourses and their way 
of doing activism. Not all women MPs supported the feminist agenda; 
feminists were dismissed as representive of only a small class of liberal 
Tunisian women, acting against the authentic values of Islam and 
indigenous culture. Nahdhawi women never denounced the campaign 
against feminist activists nor the death threats from some preachers.19 
During the process of drafting the new Constitution 2011-2014, En Nahdha 
supporters verbally and physically attacked many activists for so-called 
violations of Islamic morality. In this sense, Islamism in contemporary, 
post-revolutionary Tunisia is much more complex than just piety and 
virtuous bodily practices.  
 
The presence of women on Nahdha’s electoral list helped convince people 
that, against all established perceptions and its proven track record, the 
Islamist party was ‘women-friendly’ and believed in women’s ability and 
eligibility to lead and act in all fields. On many occasions, Ghannoushire 
assured women that his party would neither alter nor want to cancel any 
of the legal or social achievements of women. He also gave assurances that 
his party would not challenge the law on polygamy or impose the veil on 
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women. The supposed political enfranchisement of women was used as a 
progressive front, and once again a political leader tried to reserve the 
right to decide on women’s rights. Hence the demand for women’s rights 
was instrumentalised in political Islam as well as anti- Islamist discourses. 
 
The years 2011 to 2013 witnessed a shift under the new Islamist 
government towards a more explicit state-led anti-women’s rights agenda. 
Some Nahdhawi political leaders expressed their will to Islamise the 
country and society.20 Rached Ghannouchi suggested holding a 
referendum about the Personal Status Code to reconsider the clauses that 
he believed contradicted Islam, such as the prohibition of polygamy and 
the right to adoption, while some of his deputies proposed imposing 
Shari’a law. To convince people of the necessity of Shari'a law, an unveiled 
woman deputy from Nahdha, Souad Abderrahim, spoke out against Ben 
Ali’s policies and gave an impassioned tirade against liberal secular 
feminists for calling for measures to protect and support single mothers 
(Kouichi, 2011). Moreover, she defended the need for their children to 
receive social and legal protection but pointed out that they should not be 
treated legally on equal terms with married women. ‘We do not want to 
normalize children outside marriage’ (El Ouazghari, 2014). It is important 
to note that the En Nahdha party decided to recruit some unveiled women 
and give them importance. In this sense Nahdha women are not seen as 
associated with spiritual but with political Islam. Religion is a political 
agency rather than a religious one. 
 
The long history of the instrumentalisation of women for political reasons 
has made many Tunisians aware of the real incentive behind the Islamist 
party’s promotion of women. In fact, the party’s real attitude towards 
women was made clear when it suggested reforming of Article 28 of the 
draft constitution, defining women as ‘complementary’ to men. 
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Thousands of people protested against this move on 13 August 2012, 
Women’s Day in Tunisia.  
 
Many actions such as violence against women activists (Arfaoui and 
Moghadam 2016, p. 643), the call for segregation, and attempts by men to 
control women's behaviour in public, were sufficient evidence that an 
established lifestyle was being challenged (Sgrena, 2011; Wolf and 
Lefevre, 2012). There were nationwide protests against any plan to revoke 
constitutional rights. As John L. Esposito and François Burgat (2003) 
pointed out, ‘Islamists do not intend to dismantle modernity but to 
Islamize it, to create an alternative modernity’ (Esposito and Burgat 2003, 
p. 65). 
 
Women's Resistance 
 
(Author Amel Grami (left) and a university colleague Mounira Remadi (right) demonstrate 
with thousands of Tunisians for equality, not ‘complementarity’ between men and 
women on National Women’s Day in Tunis. 13 August 2012. Photo: Amel Grami.) 
 
It is evident that there is a polarisation of issues related to women in post-
revolution Tunisia. This is visible in the binarism and dichotomies that 
emerge from the debates and perception of women in the public and 
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political spheres. Many Tunisians have adopted the idea that revolution is 
not a one-off moment, but requires momentum and continuous 
resistance. The gap between women’s agendas being debated within the 
Constituent Assembly and civil society organisations has led to head-on-
collisions. The result is an increasing polarisation between the ‘Islamists’ 
and ‘secularists’. Civil society and other women's rights actors hold hostile 
political actors accountable for any regression or cancellation of rights that 
women have hitherto enjoyed. This accountability has become a weapon 
for a trading off between political parties at the Constituent Assembly. 
Statements about female excision made by a deputy from Nahdha, Habib 
Ellouz, angered a few Constituent Assembly women who demanded an 
apology. Nadia Chaâbane, elected member from Al Massar reacted by 
stating, ‘I am surprised that the ANC [National Constituent Assembly] and, 
by that, I mean the presidency of the ANC, has not yet ruled on this issue. 
It is responsible for enforcing the law and ensuring its compliance, and so 
far, it has rather kept silent’21. 
 
The old divide between urban and rural women and educated and non-
educated women has gradually been replaced by another divide between 
Islamist and secular women. There was a clear divide between the large 
number of Nahdhawi women and those from other political parties. 
However, women from left and progressive parties constituted a 
progressive block and had a unified voice thanks to their outstanding 
knowledge of and background in women’s and human rights activismat 
both the local and international levels. Some established women’s 
organisations such as AFTURD and the Association of Tunisian Women 
Democrats (ATFD) have long lobbied for legal reform, such as the parity 
law, and a law to end violence against women. Learning from the 
experiences of women’s movements in the region, Tunisian activists have 
acquired tools of resistance. Many became famous for their outspoken 
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views on the media; other politically active women have also stepped forth 
to defend the cause. 
 
The debate over the issue of ‘complementarity’ in the new constitution 
dramatically highlighted such divergence on women’s issues. Nahdha 
proposed,  
The State guarantees the protection of women rights and the 
promotion of their gains, as a real partner of men in the mission 
of the homeland building, and the roles of both should 
complement each other within the household … The State 
guarantees the extermination of all kinds of violence against 
women. (Draft Tunisian Constitution, see McNeil, 2012) 
Many Nahdha members were convinced that men and women are equal 
before God but that they should indeed have different roles within society, 
especially with regard to family obligations. Others stressed the privileged 
status given to women in the Shari’a namely through instructions on how 
mothers, wives and daughters should be by men. Beyond being a linguistic 
battle, the conflict revealed sharp differences and a tendency to pave the 
way for the adoption of Shari’a principles that see women as 
supplementary to men, rather than as full and equal partners.  
 
This binary revealed two frames of reference for women in Tunisia. One a 
push toward full and legal equality between men and women, and another 
that sought to establish a softened moral agenda of instituting difference. 
Some Constituent Assembly members launched a broad protest 
movement22 along with civil society organisations (Democratic Women's 
Association, Tunisian Women’s Association for Research and 
Development, Tunisian General Labour Union, Human Rights League and 
others). It culminated in a large march on August 13 2012, which rallied 
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7,000 women and men through downtown Tunis to protest against 
women’s perceived complementarity to men in Article 28 (Charrad and 
Zarrugh 2014, p. 236). By pushing politicised women to demand their 
rights from within a religious framework, En Nahdha leaders were 
obviously trying to alter the discourse on gender equality and give it a 
meaning compliant with the religious principles of natural inequality. 
 
Luckily, after this huge demonstration on the street and popular pressure, 
the first women's battle was won and the term ‘complementarity’ was 
removed from the constitution, but statements by some women 
Constituent Assembly members revealed the protest did not end the 
divide. Accountability was a weapon used by activists who accused those 
in power of betraying the trust given to them. Any lost right meant further 
polarisation. Although Ghannoushi declared his party would not change 
the status of women in Tunisia or the Personal Status Code, some party 
members opposed parity law, and argued for gender segregation at 
school. Moreover, some Islamists spoke of overturning the ban on 
polygamy or tolerating ‘religious marriages’ that would enable a man to 
have more than one wife simultaneously or to ‘marry’ one ‘temporarily’ 
(Moghadam, 2016). 
 
The consequence of this battle and the impact of the fall of Morsi regime 
in Egypt on Nahdha strategies was important. By placing demands on 
women deputies to function as public representatives of the ‘moderate 
Islam’ they represent, Nahdha tried to show that Tunisian Islamists were 
different. They claimed to be preaching a moderate political Islam, neither 
incompatible with democracy, nor hostile to the modern status of women 
in society. Nahdhawi women MPs maintained that they enjoy freedom of 
action, but they did not show any independence from party policies, 
decided mostly by a male-dominated central committee. They did not 
adopt, individually or as a group, any position championing women's roles 
Feminist Dissent 
 
 
44 Grami. Feminist Dissent 2018 (3), pp. 23-56 
 
and rights in political or social spheres. This shows the extent to which the 
political discourse and agendas remained divorced from visible action. The 
contrast between Nahdha’s advocacy of women’s equal participation as 
citizens in the political arena and its efforts to limit women’s rights as 
individuals (as reflected in Abderrahim’s comments, and in Nahdha’s 
proposal to define women as complementary to men) partly reflects 
divisions within the party.  It also suggests that the party’s male cohort 
make all the decisions on the matter of women’s rights.  
 
The rise of Islamist power revitalised the women's movement in post-
revolution Tunisia. Fear, anger, uncertainty and doubt pushed many 
women to join demonstrations and to raise their voices. More importantly, 
those feelings were fertile ground for productive and deep dialogues 
about the future of Tunisian women, feminist activism and feminist 
accountability. This, however, shifted the focus on accountability from 
State responsibility and duty to that of civil society and its activist leaders. 
Yet this situation has helped women voters to emerge as a political force 
to reckon with. The 2014 elections marked the advance of the newly 
constituted liberal Nidaa Tounis at the expense of Nahdha, a victory 
decided primarily by women's votes.   
 
Just as there is a politics behind the vocabulary of activism, there are also 
multiple strategies, forms and techniques of resistance. Many feminist 
activists have patched together events, convinced others of common 
objectives, and circulated knowledge about opportunities and tactics. 
They have also used Facebook, Twitter and other social media to promote 
societal change and gender equality. Associations like ‘Chaml’ have 
become prominent, with an aim to renew feminist discourse based on 
contemporary realities, mounting conservatism, yet aware of the pitfalls 
of the inherited past. ‘Chaml’ seeks to create a space where the 
intersections of various perspectives of women’s identities are expressed. 
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From these intersectional identities, they can create a diverse, plural form 
of feminism that is not shaped by Ben Ali or the media, but by women 
themselves, through their words, stories, expressions, and interactions 
with different feminist ideas in online spaces. ‘They do not want feminism 
to be defined at the top, because it does not represent the diversity of 
women in Tunisia, so they use online spaces to define and conceptualise a 
new form of grassroots Tunisian feminism’ (Mulcahey 2016, p. 63). 
 
Activists are aware that new media is creating a new sense of 
accountability toward a public increasingly challenging in its demands for 
greater transparency in state decisions and policies. Feminists have used 
these media outlets to make the state more accountable, as well as for 
outreach in an attempt to adjust negative perceptions of feminism. They 
have expressed their concerns and voiced their responsibility for the 
advancement of women’s causes and rights, giving their sense of 
accountability a social dimension shaped by and reflecting alternating 
alignments of politics, cultures, social norms and institutional 
expectations. 
 
Many feminist practitioners and scholars have questioned whether their 
work is feminist enough. Others have started to draw attention to feminist 
accountability and expressed their discomfort and hesitation. As the 
feminist Allen (2001) asked: ‘What is my responsibility to the people 
whose lives I am studying? What do I owe them for giving me the 
opportunity to get inside their lives? What do I want to give back?’23 If we 
agree that reflexivity demands continuous self-criticism, we can 
understand why some associations have adjusted their feminist agendas 
in the aftermath of the revolution. They have focused on the issue of social 
justice and have done a lot of work on rural areas. It is obvious that the 
uncomfortable feelings from feminist exchanges have furthered their 
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thinking and encouraged them to work toward more accountable 
practices. 
 
Aware that the digital world is increasingly a space of political and social 
struggle, where individuals and institutions use social media to project 
their voices and expand their sphere of influence, women from En Nahdha 
party have used this platform to convince women to integrate the political 
vision of the party and to work for its agenda. Some of them try to focus 
on issues related to the construction of religious identity and to help young 
women to be ‘good Muslims’. What is missing in Islamist online activism is 
the debate on women's associations' accountability and a serious debate 
on the future of the Tunisian women's movement.  
 
Despite increased women's activism on both sides, challenges to the 
state’s corruption, arbitrary arrests, and systematic injustices remains 
limited. There have been few attempts to build coalitions in the parliament 
around women's rights and advancement. Some Tunisian women feel the 
need to bridge divergent discourses and share the idea of Margot Badran 
that ‘[t]oday, in the final push to achieve equality in the family in Muslim 
societies, Muslim reformers as secular feminists and Islamic feminists 
need to work cooperatively more than ever before. Non-Muslims with 
knowledge, insights, and experience who share concerns about living 
together with Muslims in the same families and societies need to be an 
integral part of the debates and activist initiatives’ (Badran 2009, p. 7). But 
to date the Tunisian experience has notyet meaningfully disrupted the 
classic yet artificial secular/religious binary. 
 
 
 
Feminist Dissent 
 
 
47 Grami. Feminist Dissent 2018 (3), pp. 23-56 
 
Conclusion 
The experiences of women in post-revolution Tunisia show the extent to 
which binaries and frames may shift. But what such binaries confirm is 
essential to any feminist action, rooted in the past, responding to 
emerging complex realities, and eager to think of the future as mutually 
constructed. They also confirm that women remain agents and a force to 
be reckoned with, yet they still have much to do to liberate their action 
from tutelage and dependence. Achieving autonomy and acquiring free 
will have to start with dismantling residual forms of accountability, 
instrumentalised and invested with inherited crippling ideologies. State 
feminism of the pre-revolution period used accountability to ensure the 
loyalty of women by appropriating their cause whilst ensuring that the 
state remained the real actor. Any form of progress or achievement that 
women enjoy is developed using the existing male structures of decision-
making. Although Tunisian women have enjoyed political and civil rights 
that women in other countries of the region envy, such rights have always 
been used to disarm feminists and cripple their agency. 
 
Post-revolution Tunisia has shifted the responsibility and accountability 
from the hands of the state to that of the lawmakers and civil actors. The 
polarisation that emerged involved a resurfacing of the conservative 
Islamist agenda that obliged the progressive, modernist block to unite 
around the issue of women's rights. The battle around concepts was but 
the visible tip of the iceberg. The divide involved a clear collision between 
two ideologies and worldviews. The battle that women won marked their 
entry on the stage not as civil activists but as a political force that ended 
with changing the balance of powerthrough a massive vote by women who 
chose to support a liberal candidate. This shows the extent to which 
women's activism is essentially political. There is no alternative to political 
involvement.  
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The post-revolution events helped shape a new female agency rooted in a 
history of state feminism and shaped by the divide between progressive 
and conservative societal projects. Throughout this process, the history of 
feminist action and activism in Tunisia reveals the extent to which the 
process is dynamic and volatile requiring a continuous rallying of forces, 
education, and appropriation of language and spaces of decision-making. 
Accountability is not necessarily in the hands of the same power structure 
but is changing location and meaning. Throughout this process, female 
agency is struggling under the weight of changing structures of power and 
authority. To emerge fully, it needs an ‘enabling environment’ and the 
construction of a collective agency aware of its weight and determinant 
role in challenging authority. Its liberation is in educating women, in 
making them aware of the need to change location in terms of framing 
issues, to transgress the rule of male domination and all its residual forms. 
This is happening at various levels. For the first time, two elected 
presidents of Tunisian universities are women and in some university 
councils, women now hold the majority. There is no doubt that the future 
of Tunisia is in women's hands. They are aware of the impact of 
accountability on social relations and on the configurations of power. 
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Notes 
1 Ben Ali was President of Tunisia 1987-2011. 
2 ‘On 13 August 1956, less than five months after the proclamation of independence 
from French colonial rule, the Republic of Tunisia promulgated the Code of Personal 
Status (CPS). A set of laws regulating marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance, the 
code profoundly changed family law and the legal status of women. Together with the 
Turkish civil code of 1926, the Tunisian CPS of 1956 represented a pioneering body of 
legislation that reduced gender inequality before the law in an Islamic country’, 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-
maps/tunisia-personal-status-code 
3 In 2012 a controversy sparked by a member of Tunisia's Constituent Assembly having 
difficulty communicating in standard Arabic reopened the debate about the role of 
language in national identity and the meaning of 'Tunisianity’, see Guellouz (2016). 
Feminism and religion started clashing after the nationalist movement moved towards a 
more patriarchal and culturally traditional model that included religious language and 
symbolism. 
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4 The term ‘state feminism’ or alternatively ‘institutional feminism’, was employed 
under Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s regimes as a tool to promote gender equality and 
women’s rights to exclude the alternative politics of independent feminist activists. 
5 Scholar activist Khadija Ben Hasine scholar argues, ‘Why should we return to the 
religious text, spend our lives reading and re-reading this text, stretching it like an elastic 
to see what it will allow us?’ To use the Koran as a reference is to ‘give up on the 
universal, on our constitution, on international treaties’ and to engage with 
fundamentalists who reduce religion to talk of ‘nothing else but women’s bodies’ 
(Lindsey, 2017). 
6 Some scholars define themselves as feminists, some call themselves human rights 
activists while others see themselves as scholars/activists. Some shun labels altogether. 
After the revolution, Olfa Youssef and Zahia Jouiro declared themselves part of the 
‘Islamic feminism movement’, while Neila Sillini and I define ourselves as ‘Muslim 
feminists’. 
7 Unlike Charrad, who often draws her discussions into the theoretical, both Chekir and I 
analyse the impact of Tunisia’s laws on women to explore the practical implications of 
the legal status of women in Tunisia as compared to men. To that end, we both pair 
discussions of progress with diagnoses of remaining inequalities, citing the distance 
between the three points of law, implementation, enforcement, and practice (Petkanas 
2013). 
8 For more on Charfi see Charfi (2004), Benzine (2004), Ansary (2003), and Zeghal (2008). 
9 The Personal Status Code was passed by the first President of the Tunisian Republic, 
Habib Bourguiba, on 13 August 1956. It was sympathetic to the spirit of feminist 
egalitarianism and gave women some essential rights. 
10 For more see Colombo (2015), Debuysere (2015), Grami (2015), Johansson-Nogués 
(2013), Labidi (1998), Tais (2015), Tchaïcha and Arfaoui (2012) and Zamiti-Horchani 
(1983). 
11 Formed in the early 1980s as an Islamic opposition movement, EnNahdhais is one of 
Tunisia’s oldest and most well-organised political parties. Persecuted by the former 
regime, many leaders lived in exile or were imprisoned until the 2011 Revolution. 
12 For example, Olfa Youssef is very active on Facebook and YouTube, raising awareness 
about liberties, commenting on Al-Nahdha, the hegemony of the Ulama, and discussing 
violence against women and homosexuality. 
13 Petkanas (2013) argues the dominant narrative of the autonomous women’s 
movement in Tunisia is secular feminism. ‘It focuses exclusively on a secular, humanist, 
and internationalist discourse of feminism enshrined in organisations that acted as a 
kind of counterweight to the government. This dichotomy, which may well have been 
reflective of the public conversation, renders impossible the existence of any other 
feminisms. The prominence of female Nahdawi deputies in the post-revolutionary 
political scene prompts questions concerning the development of Islamic feminism in 
Tunisia, for which the dominant framework does not allow’ (2013, p. 6). 
14 Zeitouna University has trained theologians since the eighth century. In the late 
1950s, Bourguiba, dismantled and replaced it with a simple faculty of Shari`a and 
Theology. Under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali some forms of religiosity were excluded 
from public space, and Zeitouna was only able to continue Islamic instruction under 
close state observation. Recently, most of its scholars opposed the presidential initiative 
to reform inheritance law. Noureddine al-Khadmi, a former Minister of Religious Affairs 
and a professor at Zeitouna, said any other interpretation of the Quranic law was 
impossible (The Guardian, 2017). 
15  Such as Ettakattol Party, The Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties (one of 
the secular coalition partners within the Islamist-led government), Ettajdid (or 
Renewal) Movement, and The Movement of Socialist Democrats. 
16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3yfP2JC4WoY (Accessed 12 February 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9FJBKqeGpao (Accessed 12 February 2018). 
17 On many occasions Soumaya Ghannoushi insulted feminist activists (Ghannoushi 
2011). For more on the use of Facebook to insult activists see Zouabi (2016). 
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18 In 2006, Saida Akremi, a well-known Tunisian human rights lawyer, filed a lawsuit on 
behalf of a teacher contesting the scarf’s ban in state buildings and schools. She won, 
but the government would not enforce the ruling throughout the country on the 
grounds that it would ‘divide rather than unite’ (Tchaïcha and Arfaoui 2012). 
19 Two days after I gave a lecture on gender equality and inheritance law in 2016, some 
preachers declared in their Friday sermon that I was an apostate. 
20 Tunisians, like Egyptians, Moroccans and others have been exposed over the last 
decade to radical religious discourse and misogynic attitudes. In fact, one consequence 
of globalisation and the rapid growth of satellite TV channels in the new millennium is 
giving conservative radical preachers a powerful pulpit from which they can reach 
Muslims all over the world and sensitise them to a more conservative interpretation of 
Islam. 
21 Interview with Nadia Chaaban, by African 
Manager (https://africanmanager.com/site_eng/author/african-
manager/?v=79cba1185463, 29 March 2013). 
22 Selma Baccar, a theatre director, and member of the Constituent Assembly. 
23 We adopt K. R. Allen's definition: ‘[F]eminist accountability is expansive, non-
quantifiable, collective, and engenders deep reflexivity, critical thought, and 
fundamentally troubles the status quo’ (2001, p. 806). 
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